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Abstract: 
The “sign of consequence” is a notation for propositional logic that Peirce invented in
1886 and used at least until 1894. It substituted the “copula of inclusion” which he had
been using since 1870.
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The copula of inclusion, symbolized by “–<” (or “ ” in its cursive form) was used
extensively in Peirce’s major works on the algebra of logic in 1870-1885 (Peirce 1870,
Peirce  1880,  Peirce  1885).  The  copula  of  inclusion  was  regarded  by  Peirce  as
functionally complete, because all logical operations of the propositional calculus can be
defined in terms of inclusion and constant falsehood. It is known that Peirce discovered
the functional completeness of the joint denial for Boolean algebra in 1880 (W 4:218-
221), re-discovered and proved to be such by H. M. Sheffer in 1913. Why was inclusion
so important, then, and why did Peirce prefer the copula of inclusion to the joint denial,
given that both were provably functionally complete? The reason for the preference of
inclusion was philosophical: according to Peirce, inclusion mirrors inference. Inference,
as inclusion, is a transitive (if a b and b c, then a c), anti-symmetric (if a
b, b a does not hold) and reflexive  (a a) relation, that is, a non-strict partial
order.  In the 1881 “On The Logic of Number” (Peirce 1881) Peirce calls any such
relation  a  “fundamental  relative  of  quantity”  and  the  systems  of  objects  having  a
fundamental relation of quantity a “system of quantity” (W 4:299-300). The fundamental
relative of quantity is necessary in the construction of an axiomatic base for arithmetic
that Peirce presents in that paper (see Shields 2012). But the transitivity and anti-
symmetry of the relation of inclusion is important for Peirce because it mirrors the
relation of  the premises  to  the conclusion.  If  logic  merely  consisted in  a  blind or
syntactic manipulation of signs, any sole sufficient operator would be as good as any
other. But logic is the study of inference, and among sole sufficient operators, only
inclusion  has  the  same properties  (transitivity,  anti-symmetry,  and  reflexivity)  that
inferential  relations  have.  Thus,  “of  all  the methods in  which propositions  may be
analyzed and analyzed correctly,  that one which uses the copula of inclusion alone
corresponds to the theory of inference” (NEM 4:174, 1898).
In the 1886 “Qualitative Logic,” the copula of inclusion is substituted with the sign
of consequence:
[…] every qualitative reasoning about individuals may be expressed by the use of one single symbol
besides the expressions for the facts whose relations are examined. This symbol must signify the
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relation of antecedent to consequent. In the form I would propose for it, it takes the shape of a cross
placed between antecedent and consequent with a sort of streamer extending over the former.
Thus, “If a, then b,” would be written
From a, it follows that if b then c,” would be written
“From ‘if a, then b,’ follows c,” would be written
(W 5:361)
From the point of view of the truth-functional analysis of the propositional calculus, the
copula of inclusion and the sign of consequence are equivalent: just as the copula of
inclusion, the sign of consequence is for Peirce a sole sufficient operator. However,
Peirce considers  the sign of  consequence as  something more than a mere sign of
inclusion. So we read in an unpublished fragment:
Let us examine the relation of inclusion. The use of a triangle of dots ∴ to signify therefore is
common at this day. It seems, like other algebraic signs, to be an old punctuation mark adapted to
another use. To express inclusion, various signs are used, of which the following are the principal.
A  B Hamilton.
A ) B De Morgan. Later, A )) B.
A –< B Peirce.
A : B Maccoll
A =(= B Schröder.
There is something to be said in favor of all of these, even perhaps the last. But I shall now use a
different sign
My excuse is that this is not a mere sign of inclusion. (“The Mathematics of Logic,” MS 580)
According to the principle of the Ethics of Notation (itself an application of the principle
of the Ethics of Terminology, CP 2.219-26 = EP 2:263-66), a new notation is to be
adopted instead of an older and more established one only upon some justification. If no
justification  for  a  notational  change  can  be  provided,  then  the  older  and  more
established  form  is  to  be  maintained  (MS  253,  1903;  MS  530,  1904).  Peirce’s
Bellucci, “The Sign of Consequence” | 3
Commens: Digital Companion to C. S. Peirce (http://www.commens.org)
justification for the substitution of the sign of inclusion with the sign of consequence is
that the latter is not a mere sign of inclusion. While truth-functionally equivalent to the
signs of inclusion used by Peirce and his fellow logicians, the sign of consequence
combines  in  one notational  devices  two functions  that  in  other  notations  are  kept
distinct:  the  sign  of  consequence  is  both  a  sign  of  a  truth-function  and  a
collectional sign.
[A] further notational convention must be introduced. Using parentheses, just as they are used in
algebra, as binding signs, we have to distinguish between
and
To do this, we have only to establish the convention that the vinculum, or horizontal line, which
forms a part of the sign of consequence is [to] be extended over the whole antecedent, and all
possible ambiguity is removed, without the use of parentheses. Thus, we write
and
(MS 559: 8, c. 1894, formulas in Peirce’s hand)
In the notation of the sign of inclusion, in order to distinguish A (B C) from (A
B) C one needs to use parentheses or other conventions. For example, Peirce
treats inclusion as left-associative, and thus writes x y z for x (y z) (W
5:176, 1885). By contrast, with the sign of consequence this is not necessary: the scope
of horizontal bar or vinculum denotes the antecedent in all cases. Peirce is thus justified
in claiming that the sign of consequence does not merely correspond to the sign of
inclusion. Rather, it corresponds to the sign of inclusion plus parentheses, because it
fulfills the functions (truth-function and collectional function) that in the former notation
were fulfilled by the joint actions of the sign of inclusion and of the parentheses.
Peirce also suggests that the sign of consequence can be “truncated” and read off as
a disjunction:
[W]e can cut the sign of consequence into two parts, the cross signifying ‘or,’ the vinculum ‘not’.
Thus,
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may be regarded as
meaning not X or Y is true. […] this modification of our notation is so vastly more convenient than
what we had before, that the student may well ask why I did not adopt it from the beginning. The
answer is, that in thus breaking the sign of consequence and inconsequence we shutter all vestiges
of the logical origin of the signs of aggregation and composition. Now, I consider the convenience of
a logical algebra a very secondary consideration, since it  is of no very great importance as a
calculus, while it is very important as an instrument of logical analysis (“The Algebra of the Copula”,
MS 411: 232-233, c. 1894; formulas in Peirce’s hand).
The sign of consequence can be “truncated” in two Boolean parts: the vinculum, which
expresses negation, and the usual cross, which as in other of Peirce’s papers expresses
disjunction. We thus have a “notational derivation” from the untruncated form –  –
to the truncated one –  – which shows how negation and disjunction can be derived
from the conditional without any structural remodeling of the notation. The truncated
version may well be easier to manage, and thus preferable from the point of view of the
calculus; but the untruncated version is more philosophical, because it brings (truth-
functional) analysis to its extreme (sole sufficient operator).
The sign of consequence itself underwent notational transformations. In particular, in
summer 1896 Peirce must have realized that by transforming the vinculum of the sign of
consequence into an oval, thereby abandoning the mono-dimensional in favor of the two-
dimensional arrangement, what one gets is a version of the Entitative Graphs presented
in  Peirce  1897:   became  .  With  the  transformation  of  the  sign  of
consequence into the distinctive notation of logical graphs, the oval or cut, the road to
Existential Graphs was now open.
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